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The Legitimation of Sex
Discrimination: A Critical
Response to Supreme Court
Jurisprudence
T HE path of sex discrimination law, as it has been shaped by
the United States Supreme Court,' provides an enlightening
glimpse into the workings of the American legal system and the
nature of its commitment to equal rights for women and men.
The notion of "Equal Justice Under Law" 2 is an important prom-
ise of our legal order. This message of equality is so fundamental
to American jurisprudence that a guarantee of "equal protection
of the laws" was incorporated into the United States Constitution
as part of the fourteenth amendment.3
The ideology of equality is an integral part of this judicial sys-
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco; A.B. 1970, Stanford University;
J.D. 1973, Stanford University School of Law. The author thanks Kathy Mount,
Joan Neisser, Mary Sylvester, and especially Gretchen Strain for their research assis-
tance and support. The author also thanks Professor Dolores Donovan, Professor
Peter Gabel, and Professor Sylvia Law. My special gratitude is extended to my col-
league, Professor Charles R. Lawrence III.
I This Article is limited to United States Supreme Court cases litigated on constitu-
tional, rather than statutory, grounds. An analysis similar to the one presented here
could be made of lower court cases, or of discrimination cases decided on statutory
grounds. That task, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
2 This language is sculpted as a legend above the entrance to the Supreme Court
building. For an interesting discussion arguing that "Equal Justice Under Law" is a
bankrupt idea, see Westen, The Empty Idea ofEquality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
See also Burton, Comment On "Empty Ideas" Logical Positivist Analyses of Equality
andRules, 91 YALE L.J. 1136 (1982); Westen, On "Confusing Ideas" Reply, 91 YALE
L.J. 1153 (1982).
3 The fourteenth amendment provides in relevant part: "No State shall ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The notion of
equal protection of the laws has also been held to be protected from denial by the
federal government under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973).
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tern. It is an ideology that perpetuates the myth that ours is a
classless society in which all citizens function as equivalent mem-
bers, and where social rewards are dispensed for merit alone.a
Realistically, of course, our social system does not operate in that
manner. Despite the rhetoric of equality, gender determines
much about the role an individual in this society will be permitted
to play.5
The fourteenth amendment's vision of equality of rights is to
ensure full participation in the social scheme to all citizens. The
benefits of such participation, including access to education, em-
ployment opportunity, recreational opportunity, and general con-
trol over one's own life, have been denied to women as a group
within the patriarchal framework of our culture. The Supreme
Court's present "equality" analysis is masking the existing distri-
bution of societal benefits which denies full participation to wo-
men. Nothing emerges from the cases which articulates clearly
that sex discrimination must be combated in order to foster the
empowerment of women as full social participants.
The Supreme Court sex discrimination cases have purported to
be concerned with achieving equality between women and men,
but in fact the precedents legitimize sex discriminatory attitudes
and behavior. The jurisprudential classification of cases, the
methods of analysis and, in many instances, the holdings of the
cases themselves reinforce the notion that gender determines one's
appropriate social role. The evolving Supreme Court jurispru-
dence presents a confused double message: Sex discrimination is
not allowed, unless ending it means changing anything. The
troubling result of this dichotomy is to perpetuate sex discrimina-
tion, resulting in diminishment of women's power in society.
Two principal forces have led to this jurisprudence. First, cer-
tain discriminatory behaviors have not been understood by the
Court to implicate issues of sex discrimination. Instead, these
cases have been analyzed in terms of constitutional doctrines un-
related to equal protection, without acknowledging the relation-
4 For an excellent discussion of these ideas, see Lawrence, "Justice" or "Just Us'
Racism and the Role of Ideology, 35 STAN. L. REV. 831 (1983). See also Balbus,
Commodity Form and Legal Form. An Essay on the "Relative Autonomy" of the Law,
II LAW & Soc'Y REV. 571 (1977).
5 Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment. An Approach to the
Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581, 584-85 (1977). Other factors besides gender-for ex-
ample, social class and race-are also major factors which determine permissible so-
cial roles. This essay, however, will focus on sex roles.
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ship these cases have to sex discrimination. As a result, the sex
discrimination aspect of the questions presented have not been
considered seriously, and the sexual stereotypes continue unchal-
lenged. This process can clearly be seen in the recent abortion
decisions, which address the constitutional right to privacy with-
out ever considering the rights at stake in terms of sex
discrimination.6
Second, even when gender-based classifications have been seen
as raising a discrimination issue and have been argued* and ana-
lyzed in terms of equal protection, the equal protection vocabu-
lary has developed in such a way as to maintain the
discriminatory status quo. The continuing use of the traditional
"comparison mode" of analysis-that is, comparing women to
men as the starting point of equal protection review-has made
the development of a real end to sex discrimination impossible.
This essay examines the multiple problems which have arisen as
a result of the use of this comparison mode of analysis. Any anal-
ysis that requires comparing women to men establishes men as the
normative model. This prioritization of maleness inherently dis-
advantages women. Further, the comparison format emphasizes
individuals rather than focusing attention on women as a group
and ignores the diminishment of women's collective power that is
perpetuated by sex discrimination.
The current equal protection analysis, which stresses the com-
parison of women to men, often tolerates conduct that is, in fact,
discriminatory.7 For example, treating a woman differently and
disadvantageously on account of pregnancy has not been viewed
by the Court as sex discrimination violative of the fourteenth
amendment.'
Another fundamental problem with the comparison mode is its
requirement that those groups being compared be "similarly situ-
ated."9 This is impossible in our society. In our society blacks are
not similarly situated to whites, nor are women similarly situated
to men. Both blacks and women have experienced centuries of
discrimination, and the effects of that experience are still present.
In this culture, the social reality of women is quite different from
6 See infra text accompanying notes 186-98.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 113-54.
8 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974). See also infra text accompa-
nying notes 75-76.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 131-45.
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that of men.' ° If people have been treated differently in society
they will appear in dissimilar positions when they are compared.
Therefore, they cannot be similarly situated for purposes of equal
protection review. To the extent that being similarly situated is a
prerequisite for constitutional scrutiny of differential treatment,
any such comparison will necessarily result in continued disparate
treatment and discrimination.
Finally, litigants have been forced to describe the harm result-
ing from the discriminatory action in such a way as to fit into the
framework of accepted equal protection vocabulary, thus dis-
torting the claim. Most lawyers have equated the protection of-
fered women by the equal protection clause with a protection
from discrimination as described by the conventional comparison
mode. I  Equating equal protection with discrimination in this
way has hampered women's ability to achieve equal protection of
the laws. The Supreme Court decisions have looked at how wo-
men have been treated in relation to how men have been treated,
rather than looking at the treatment of women generally. Thus,
actions that discriminate against both women and men are not
found to be violative of the equal protection clause.
The essential premise of this Article is simple. Any stigmatizing
conduct which inhibits the full participation of women in society
should be found unconstitutional under the equal protection
clause. Action by government 12 need not be discriminatory in a
10 B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON, S., Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND
THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES (1975) [hereinafter cited as B. BABCOCK]; H. KAY,
TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1981); Dono-
van & Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-De-
fense and Provocation, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 435 (1981). See also D. BELL, RACE,
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980).
I1 See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108
(1976) ("When asked what the Equal Protection Clause means, an informed lawyer
... does not repeat the words of the Clause-a denial of equal protection. Instead,
he [sic] is likely to respond that the Clause prohibits discrimination.").
12 The wording of the fourteenth amendment provides that "No State shall .
deny. . . the equal protection of the laws." Thus the doctrine of state action necessi-
tates finding state involvement in order to address a violation of the equal protection
clause. Important cases on the state action doctrine include: Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (heavily-regulated private utility); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (private club with a state liquor license); Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (privately-donated park controlled and maintained by
the state); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (private restau-
rant in a state building); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement
of a discriminatory contract). See B. BABCOCK, supra note 10, at 88-89.
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comparative sense to constitute a violation.' 3 Women, who
should be full participants in society, need not be treated differ-
ently than men in order to offend judicial notions of equal protec-
tion. Different treatment, measured by the comparison mode, is
only one form of conduct which hampers full participation. Any
treatment which stigmatizes women or restricts their choice of so-
cial role, particularly that which would necessarily confine women
to the private sphere, is offensive to the achievement of equal
protection.
The vision of "equality of rights," as the fourteenth amendment
language states, must be maintained. If a particular treatment
abridges the equal protection of the laws in terms of the ultimate
attainment of full participation in society, then that treatment vio-
lates the fourteenth amendment. Hence, the comparison mode of
equal protection theory is not useful. Instead, the equality of
rights approach as embodied in the "participatory perspective"' 4
is a more appropriate jurisprudential model for deciding chal-
lenges which allege that a particular statute is violative of equal
protection.
Part I of this Article examines the evolution of the comparison
mode of equal protection review. Part II surveys the history of sex
discrimination law in the Supreme Court through the 1975 term.
Part III, scrutinizing the post-1975 equal protection cases which
have upheld sex discriminatory classifications, and Part IV,
describing the post-1975 equal protection cases which have struck
sex discriminatory classifications, illustrate how these two lines of
cases have both legitimized sex discrimination by the language of
the opinions and by the Court's use of the comparative mode of
equal protection review. The cases described in Part V, which are
sex discrimination cases in fact, but which have been analyzed on
other grounds, have also legitimized sex discriminatory attitudes.
Finally, Part VI discusses the participatory perspective mode of
analysis for equal protection review.
13 Fiss, supra note 11, at 158 ("Discrimination, arbitrary or otherwise, is only one
form-one form among many-of conduct that disadvantages a group. There may
be group-disadvantaging conduct that is not discriminatory. This would be true of
state conduct that seemed beyond the reach of the Equal Protection Clause .... ").
14 See infra text of Part VI. I am indebted to Professor Kathryn Powers for the
phrase "participatory perspective." See Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent
Directions of Sex Discrimination Law, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 55, 102 (1979).
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I
THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMPARISON MODE OF
EQUAL PROTECTION REVIEW
The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."' 5 Although this clause was written into the Constitution
with the passage of the fourteenth amendment, legal arguments
based on equal protection theory were not successfully utilized
early in the history of the fourteenth amendment. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes wrote in 1927 that the equal protection clause
was the "last resort" of constitutional argument. 16
In 1949 Tussman and tenBroek wrote their very influential arti-
cle on the meaning of the equal protection clause.' 7 This article
influenced the development of the current comparison mode of
equality analysis. Tussman and tenBroek introduced a new vo-
cabulary into equal protection jurisprudence, asking whether a
complainant was "similarly situated with respect to the purpose of
the law"' 8 to other individuals. Depending on how the question
was answered the authors then described legislative classifications
as reasonable, unreasonable, overinclusive, underinclusive, or
both.' 9 Thus, the notion of comparing the complainant to others
with respect to the purpose of the law was implicit in the Tuss-
man-tenBroek view of equal protection.
The comparison mode of analyzing equal protection challenges
to statutes is certainly a familiar one. The equal protection clause
was applied to cases involving unequal treatment on account of
race, 20 national origin," and alienage2 2 prior to its relatively re-
15 All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
16 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).




2 OEg., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S.
526 (1963).
21 Eg., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
2 2 Eg., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (197 1); Takahashi v. Fish and Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
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cent application to gender. In each of these situations, an individ-
ual showed that a law perpetuated disparate treatment in violation
of the Constitution by comparing the treatment of the individual
to treatment received by those in another social group. For exam-
ple, a Mexican-American excluded from juries complained that
whites were not similarly excluded.23 A woman barred from the
practice of law claimed that men could practice law and, there-
fore, she should be admitted to practice.24 A black excluded from
a public swimming pool complained that whites were allowed to
S~M25swim.2
Race discrimination has served as the prototype for equal pro-
tection litigation. Treatment of blacks in a particular context was
compared to treatment of whites in the same context in order to
determine if equal treatment was being received by members of
both groups. Where blacks were dealt with dissimilarly because
of race, the practice was held to be in violation of the constitu-
tional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. This practice of
measuring equal treatment by comparing members of a group dis-
criminated against to a mainstream group has been raised to a
jurisprudential model for all equal protection analysis.
The comparison mode of equal protection review is not man-
dated by constitutional language. While much has been written
about the framers' intent in enacting the fourteenth amendment,26
it can hardly be said that there is a consensus of interpretation.27
To be sure, there is no more specific support for the comparison
mode of analysis, as put forth by Tussman and tenBroek,28 than
there is for some other approach to equal protection theory.29
23 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
24 Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
25 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
2 6 See, e.g., H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908);
J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1956); J. TENBROEK,
EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965); Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "'Equal
Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131 (1950).
27 See Fiss, supra note 11, at 118-19.
28 1d. at 132.
29 Several scholars have described alternative modes of equal protection review.
Owen Fiss has compared the existing methodology, which he terms the "anti-discrim-
ination principle," with a "group disadvantaging principle." Fiss, supra note I1.
Catherine MacKinnon prefers an "equality approach" to the present approach, which
she terms a "differences approach." C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN (1979). Alan Freeman has described equal protection arguments
in terms of a "victim" versus "perpetrator perspective." Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
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Yet, the comparison format dominates equal protection review.
Sex discrimination litigation has been shaped to fit into this com-
parison mode of analysis, causing serious implications for our
ability to perceive and understand the issues presented by the so-
cial problem of that discrimination.
II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEX DISCRIMINATION LAW
THROUGH 1975
The comparison mode of equal protection review was intro-
duced into the body of sex discrimination law in the early 1970's
when litigators began to frame their constitutional arguments in a
manner parallel to the growing body of equal protection jurispru-
dence in cases involving race, alienage, and national origin. Since
so few sex discrimination cases were decided before the flurry of
litigation in the 1970's, it was necessary to develop a vocabulary
with which to debate sex discrimination issues. At the time, the
decision to use the existing jurisprudential model made strategic
sense. Now, however, we must determine whether that choice has
led away from the ultimate goals of ending sex discrimination and
empowering women as full participants in society.
The following overview of the development of sex discrimina-
tion law illustrates how the use of the conventional comparison
format in equal protection analysis has not served, and in fact has
impeded, these ultimate goals.
Discrimination Through Anti-discrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court
Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978).
The notions of a comparison mode, describing the manner in which the Court has
assessed the issue of equality of rights, as contrasted to a participatory perspective,
which this Article describes as a preferred principle to be used in equal protection
review, is indebted to this existing body of scholarship.
There are differences, however. Freeman's language is used to illustrate how
Supreme Court jurisprudence has served to legitimate race discrimination rather than
to argue for a specific change in equal protection review. While I agree with Fiss that
the equal protection clause needs a mediating principle which is different than the one
currently being used, I do not believe the current theory is really an anti-discrimina-
tion principle, but rather one that perpetuates discrimination. I also disagree with
Fiss's idea that women should be entitled to less protection under his proposed group-
disadvantaging principle. My principal disagreement with MacKinnon is in her use
of the term "equality approach" to describe her preferred analysis. All of these vari-
ous approaches could be characterized as equality approaches. While the objective of
an "equality approach" may be to end discrimination in order to empower women
and enable them to participate fully in society, that language of equality is too vague
in relation to the goal.
[Volume 63, 19841
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A. The Early Cases
The pre-1970 history of sex discrimination law is short and
bleak. Sex discriminatory laws which barred women from the le-
gal profession,3° from the right to employment as bartenders,3
from the right to serve on juries,32 and from the right to vote33
survived constitutional challenges. In these important areas of
employment, public service, and participation in the political pro-
cess, the Court found that disparate treatment of women was ac-
ceptable. Whether citing the law of the creator,34 recognizing the
perceived appropriate place of woman in society,35 or claiming ju-
dicial deference to legislative judgments regarding a woman's role
in the work force,36 the reasoning in these cases displayed clear
judicial agreement with the disadvantageous treatment women
were receiving. 37
Laws which provided maximum hours women could work 38
and minimum wages women could earn 39 were also challenged as
sex discriminatory. Even though labor statutes such as these
30 See, e.g., In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130 (1873).
31 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
32 Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
33 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
34 Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring) ("The paramount
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] the noble and benign offices of wife
and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be
adapted to the general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional
cases.").
35 Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. at 61-62. ("Despite the enlightened emancipation of
women from the restrictions and protections of bygone years, and their entry into
many parts of community life formerly considered to be reserved to men, woman is
still regarded as the center of home and family life.").
36 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. at 466 ("Since bartending by women may, in the
allowable legislative judgment, give rise to moral and social problems against which it
may devise preventive measures, . . . [tihis Court is certainly not in a position to
gainsay such belief by the Michigan legislature.").
37 The language of the Goesaert majority opinion illustrates the lack of seriousness
with which plaintiff's claims were considered. The Court used phrases such as "Be-
guiling as the subject is," and "the alewife, sprightly and ribald" to refer to the wo-
man plaintiff. 335 U.S. at 465. The Court ignored the real issue of economic freedom
for women which was at the root of plaintiff's complaint. See B. BABCOCK, supra
note 10, at 96.
38 See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292
(1924); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373
(1915); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914).
39 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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could easily have been drafted in sex-neutral language,4 ° the
Court was untroubled by the drafters' use of gender-based classifi-
cations, explaining that the biological differences between women
and men justified the special protection received by women. 4 ,
Thus, the special social position of women, and the biological
differences between men and women emerged in these cases as
justifications for sex-based classifications. These classifications
clearly disadvantaged women by preventing women from making
choices about their own destiny, and by keeping women out of
jobs and denying them a meaningful role in the public sphere.
In two early cases, male plaintiffs attempted to invalidate stat-
utes which made gender distinctions "favoring" women. Unsuc-
cessfully, the men argued that they were entitled to the "benefit"
that women were given by the laws. In one case, the challenged
statute said women did not have to pay a license fee to do hand
laundry work. 42 The statute was upheld because, the Court rea-
soned, a state could put "a lighter burden upon women than upon
men with regard to an employment that our people commonly re-
gard as more appropriate for the former. 43 In the second case, a
statute provided that women did not have to pay a poll tax.44 This
statute was also upheld by the Court because of the "burdens nec-
essarily borne [by women] for the preservation of the race." 45
Woman's "appropriate place" in the social structure (doing laun-
dry is a good job for women) and biological difference (women
have babies, so how can they vote?) were considered adequate j us-
tifications for sex-based classifications which were damaging to
the male plaintiffs. It is important to note, however, that these
disadvantages to men as a result of gender classifications were not
used to correct any past discrimination against women, but rather
40 Labor statutes eventually were drafted to include all workers, with no differenti-
ation by sex. See B. BABCOCK, supra note 10, at 53.
41 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. at 422 ("[Hler physical structure and a proper dis-
charge of her maternal functions--having in view not merely her own health, but the
well-being of the race-justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the
passion of man."). See also West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. at 394 ("It is
manifest that this established principle is peculiarly applicable in relation to the em-
ployment of women in whose protection the State has a special interest."); Miller v.
Wilson, 236 U.S. at 382 (referring to the legislature's ability to control women's hours
as "the reasonable exertion of protective authority").
42 Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912).
43 Id. at 63.
44 Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
4 5 1d. at 282.
[Volume 63, 19841
HeinOnline  -- 63 Or. L. Rev. 274 1984
Sex Discrimination
to perpetuate the notion of woman's special, disadvantageous,
place.
The one case in which equal treatment for women was ad-
vanced and in which the Court recognized that women should not
receive special treatment was a criminal case in which the Court
found that a woman and her husband could be charged separately
with the crime of conspiracy.46 The Court wrote that upholding
the dismissal of the indictment against the woman defendant
"would require us to disregard the vast changes in the status of
woman-the extension of her rights and correlative duties."4 7
These cases set an ideological precedent. While the Court is
willing to cite changes in the status of women to uphold a decision
which furthers the idea that the criminal law is applied evenly to
all citizens, other early decisions illustrate that the Court is just as
eager to perpetuate the notion that the home is the appropriate
place for women, especially where that ideology is necessary to
perpetuate the existing social order.
Two ideas emerge from these early cases: the idea that women
have a special, or inferior, role to play in society;4 8 and the idea
that there is a biological difference between women and men that
justifies this special status.49 These notions were not, of course,
created by judges; they were existing societal ideas. Judges,
however, used them as justifications for perpetuating sex
discrimination.
By the 1970's there was less societal agreement that women had
a special, inferior place in society. As more women entered the
work force, attitudes that relegated women to the private sphere
began to change. Much of the language in the judicial opinions of
the 1970's is devoted to emphasizing that women are no longer
limited to the home. While no one, of course, disputes that bio-
logical differences do exist between women and men-the defini-
tive difference between the sexes is the exclusive ability of women
to bear children-confusion about the importance of this differ-
ence to the ideology of equality continues to be reflected in the
emerging sex discrimination jurisprudence of the 1970's.
Although several of the early cases mentioned above have now
46 United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51 (1960).
4 7 Id. at 54.
48 See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. at 61-62; Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. at 466;
Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. at 141.
49 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. at 422.
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been disapproved, 50 subsequent sex discrimination cases simply
employ a modem version of the old arguments regarding the ap-
propriate place for women in society and regarding the impor-
tance of biological differences between men and women. The
Supreme Court still avoids addressing the issue of eliminating sex
discrimination, and continues to uphold laws that are disadvanta-
geous to women.
B. Contemporary Jurisprudence.: The Crystallization of a
Standard of Review
The majority of the Supreme Court sex discrimination cases
have been decided in the last twelve years.5' While the lack of
extensive litigation in this area prior to the 1970's surely does not
mean that the social problem of sex discrimination did not exist,
many factors may explain the sudden burst of litigation. For in-
stance, the return of a feminist social movement52 following the
1960's civil rights movement, and the increase of women in law
schools53 during that same time period must certainly have been
important factors in the rise of sex discrimination litigation.
Prior to 1970, sex discrimination cases were not usually taken
seriously54 and were not discussed in terms of gender-based dis-
crimination. A legal vocabulary specific to these issues had not
yet been developed. Early litigators bringing sex discrimination
cases to the Court argued and sought to have the claims consid-
ered in the same manner and with the same vocabulary that had
been used in other discrimination cases. An equal protection
analysis emerged with an emphasis on comparisons and tests for
review. Much of the litigation focused on efforts to convince the
Court to apply a "strict scrutiny" standard of review,55 which was
the paradigm used in race cases.
50 Bradwell v. State was criticized by Justice Brennan in a plurality opinion he
wrote for the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973); Goesaert
v. Cleary was disapproved in a footnote in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.23
(1976); Hoyt v. Florida was disapproved by Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion
to Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 641-42 (1972).
51 This "veritable explosion" of sex discrimination case law development in the
Supreme Court was noted in W. WILLIAMS, SUPPLEMENT TO SEX DISCRIMINATION
AND THE LAW 5 (1978).
52 See SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL, xvii-xxxvi (R. Morgan ed. 1970).
5 3 See C. EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 5 (1981).
54 See, e.g., supra note 37. See also supra text accompanying notes 30-50.
55 See infra text accompanying notes 62-67. For the development of the strict scru-
tiny standard of review, see supra text accompanying notes 16-25.
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The most serious problem with this litigious focus on develop-
ing a vocabulary in sex discrimination cases to parallel earlier dis-
crimination decisions was that this language, not developed for,
nor especially suited to the issues raised by sex discrimination
cases, abstracted legal thinking away from the heart of the issues.
Litigation was directed towards problems such as the appropriate
standards of review. Thus, form, L e., the struggle over the appro-
priate standard of review, was elevated over substance, i.e., com-
bating discrimination. The resulting jurisprudence perpetuated
the substantive discrimination by failing to address it.
Sex discrimination is so pervasive and occasionally so subtle
that people often do not recognize a discriminatory situation when
it occurs. The lack of a vocabulary to describe sex discrimination
contributes to this problem. What we cannot verbalize, we cannot
recognize. The feminst movement in the late 1960's helped to cre-
ate the vocabulary necessary to discuss the real-life problems of
discrimination, including unpaid work in the home, women earn-
ing less than men for similar work, and the importance of freedom
of choice as to abortion. However, although this vocabulary ade-
quately describes the social issues of sex discrimination as it af-
fects women's lives, it has been distorted when translated into
legal language. An examination of the early 1970's sex discrimi-
nation cases illustrates how this language of the feminist move-
ment was distorted.
In 1970, in Reed v. Reed,56 the Court struck down a sex-based
classification for the first time in its history, holding that the pref-
erence in Idaho law for appointment of males as administrators of
a decedent's estate could not withstand an equal protection chal-
lenge. Much has been written about this opinion,5 7 which stated
that the Idaho classification could not be upheld because it was
based on overbroad and archaic notions about women. The Court
wrote, "A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and sub-
56404 U.S. 71 (1971).
5 7 See, e.g., Krauskopf, Sex Discrimination-Another Shibboleth Legally Shattered,
37 Mo. L. REV. 377 (1972); Supreme Court Report: Women Have Equal Right to Ad-
minister Estates, 58 A.B.A. J. 193 (1972); Note, The Reed Case: The Seed for Equal
Protection from Sex-Based Discrimination, or Polite Judicial Hedging?, 5 AKRON L.
REV. 251 (1972); Note, 5 CREIGHTON L. REV. 353 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law
The Equal Protection Clause and Women's Rights, 19 Loy. L. REV. 542 (1973); Note,
43 Miss. L.J. 418 (1972); Note, 2 TEX. S. L. REV. 329 (1972); Note, 1972 Wis. L. REV.
626.
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stantial relation to the object of the legislation . .. ' "'58 The state
law preferred men to women as administrators, according to the
state's counsel, because men had more business experience than
women.5 9 Reed is an interesting case because undoubtedly the
state's purported rationale was factually true. Men generally have
had more business experience than women. Furthermore, it was
administratively convenient, as the state argued, to prefer one
group over another and to avoid holding individual hearings to
qualify administrators in each case.6° Yet, the Court found these
rational bases for the sex-based classification inadequate to war-
rant upholding the classification. Generalizations about the busi-
ness experience of men were insufficient because many women
could also be capable administrators. Administrative convenience
did not outweigh enabling capable women to participate.
The Court's decision implies that prior inexperience will not au-
tomatically suffice to keep women out of business or legal work in
the future. In addition, administrative convenience will not justify
sex-based classifications. The justices were willing to remove their
blindfolds and actually see that a problem of sex discrimination
existed, and act to eradicate it.
Proponents of equal rights were excited by the Reed decision
because it suggested that scrutiny of sex-based classifications
under the equal protection clause could lead to an end to sex dis-
crimination. 6' The Court seemed to address the real social dis-
crimination that women suffered: the denial of admittance to the
public sphere as exemplified by the field of estate administration.
This optimism continued with the decision in Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson .62 Although merely a plurality decision, Frontiero contin-
ued in the path begun in Reed by implementing a new judicial
perspective on sex-based classifications. In Frontero, the plaintiff
challenged provisions of the United States Code63 that required
servicewomen to prove the dependent status of a spouse in order
to receive certain benefits. Servicemen were not required to pro-
58 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412, 415 (1920)).
59 Brief for Respondent at 12, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
60 404 U.S. at 76.
61 See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court:. A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1972); Krauskopf, supra note 57.
62 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
63 1d. at 678-79.
[Volume 63, 19841
HeinOnline  -- 63 Or. L. Rev. 278 1984
Sex Discrimination
vide similar proof of spousal dependency. The four justices in the
plurality described their analysis as strict scrutiny so that sex dis-
crimination would fit into the existing body of equal protection
jurisprudence.64
The language of the Court's analysis, however, belied the no-
tion that it was strict scrutiny in the same sense that the phrase has
been used in other equal protection cases. The classic phrasing of
strict scrutiny required the state to bear the burden of proving the
challenged classification was necessary to promote a compelling
government objective.65 Yet the plurality wrote, "The Govern-
ment offers no concrete evidence . . . tending to support its view
that such differential treatment in fact saves the Government any
money."66 The language in the decision raised many questions.
What if the government had offered "concrete evidence" that
money could be saved? Would saving money justify a sex-based
classification? Would "concrete evidence" be equivalent to proof
that a sex-based classification was "necessary"?
Many commentators saw Reed and Frontiero as heralding an
important change in the course of Supreme Court doctrine.67 At
first blush they looked like promising decisions that would lead to
strict scrutiny of gender-based classifications. It appeared that the
Court was building a series of cases that would truly examine the
problem of sex discrimination. A close reading of Frontiero, how-
ever, revealed that the equal protection analysis used by the
Court, as it ostensibly, sought to expand the comparison mode of
equal protection review into the sex discrimination area, would
not serve to achieve full participation for women. Furthermore,
the stage was being set in other decisions of the Court for a paral-
lel body of sex discrimination case law that would keep intact cen-
turies of discrimination.
Three cases, Stanley v. Illinois ,68 Roe v. Wade ,69 and Doe v. Bol-
ton7" indicated that the Supreme Court was not handling the is-
sues in a way that would lead to the eradication of sex
64Id. at 688. See supra text accompanying notes 16-25.
65 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972) ("In sum, durational residence laws
must be measured by a strict equal protection test: they are unconstitutional unless
the State can demonstrate that such laws are 'necessary to promote a compelling gov-
ernmental interest.'" (emphasis in original)) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634 (1969)).
66 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 689.
67 See Gunther, supra note 61. See also supra note 57.
68 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
69410 U.S. 113, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
70410 U.S. 179, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
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discrimination. Although these cases involved important ques-
tions concerning the empowerment of and discrimination against
women, the Court did not analyze them in terms of equal protec-
tion, nor recognize that they involved issues of sex discrimination.
In Stanley v. Illinois, decided the same term as Reed, the peti-
tioner Peter Stanley had been living intermittently for eighteen
years with Joan Stanley, to whom he was not married. They had
three children. Under Illinois law, the children of unwed fathers
become wards of the state upon the death of the mother. Thus,
when Joan Stanley died, the children were declared wards of the
state, taken from petitioner, and placed with a guardian. Peti-
tioner appealed, claiming that he had never been shown to be an
unfit parent.7 ' He also pointed out that under the law an unmar-
ried mother could not have been deprived of her children without
a hearing. The Court agreed with petitioner, and held that he was
entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children
could be taken away from him.
Interestingly, the Court did not use the equal protection com-
parative perspective to analyze this case. Instead, the decision was
reached on due process grounds, emphasizing the individual peti-
tioner's right to a hearing. The Court also noted the importance
of making individual determinations in the area of family law.72
It is unclear why the Court refrained from using the proffered
equal protection analysis here.73 The Court must have realized
that men could also be discriminated against on account of sex;
perhaps the Court was unable to consider seriously the claims of a
male in the traditionally female sphere of the family.
The Court's confusion about sex discrimination was further il-
lustrated by the first abortion decisions, Roe v. Wade and Doe v.
Bolton. No single issue is more central to equality for women
than the right to autonomy in the areas of childbirth and repro-
ductive freedom. Without such a right, women are not free to
participate in any social spheres. Yet the Court failed, or refused,
to perceive that Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton were cases about
71 405 U.S. at 646.
72 Id. at 656-57 ("Procedure by presumption is always ... easier than individual-
ized determination. But when . . . the procedure forecloses the determinative issues
of competence . . . , when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past
formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both
parent and child. It therefore cannot stand.").
73 Id. at 647; see also Brief for Petitioner at 9-36, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972).
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equality and sex discrimination.7 4 Instead, the Court reached the
decision to strike the state abortion statute in each case on privacy
grounds.
The 1973-74 term signaled the death knell for any hope that the
Court was promoting sexual equality through an equal protection
analysis. The subject of pregnancy and sex discrimination raised
by Geduldig v. Aiello7  demonstrated either overwhelming igno-
rance, or incredible malevolence, by the Court towards the notion
of full social participation for women. In a decision that remains
impossible to explain to non-lawyers, the Court decided that treat-
ing a woman differently and disadvantageously on account of
pregnancy was not sex discrimination at all.76 The very outra-
geousness of the idea that disadvantageous disparate treatment
based on pregnancy is not gender-based illustrates the extent of
the insidiousness of the comparison mode of analyzing equal pro-
tection cases. Without a pregnant man with whom to compare the
treatment of pregnant women, the Court was unable to see, or re-
fused to see, that disadvantageous disparate treatment of women
74 Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of New Women Lawyers, Women's Health and
Abortion Project, Inc., National Abortion Action Coalition, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
75 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
76 The idea was so unremarkable to the members of the Court that it was relegated
to a footnote in the opinion:
The dissenting opinion lo the contrary, this case is thus a far cry from cases
like Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973), involving discrimination based upon gender as such. The Cali-
fornia insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility
because of gender but merely removes one physical condi-
tion-pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities. While it is true
that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legisla-
tive classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like
those considered in Reed, supra, and Fronliero, supra. Normal pregnancy is
an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics.
Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts
designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one
sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude
pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable
basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition.
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such
under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis.
The program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women
and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the
second includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of
the program thus accrue to members of both sexes.
Id. at 496-97 n.20.
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on account of pregnancy could seriously affect their participation
in the paid labor force, as well as in other social spheres.
The sex-based classification challenged in Kahn v. Shevin,7 de-
cided in the same term, involved Florida's decision to provide a
property tax exemption for widows, but not widowers. The Court
upheld this classification, agreeing with the lower court that the
appropriate test was whether the sex-based classification bore a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. The
Court identified the object of the legislation as "being the reduc-
tion of 'the disparity between the economic capabilities of a man
and a woman.' "78
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, commented that
"[wihether from overt discrimination or from the socialization
process of a male-dominated culture, the job market is inhospita-
ble to the woman seeking any but the lowest paid jobs."7 9 This
judicial recognition of the existence of a male-dominated culture
and its correlative economic impact on women is very unusual.
Despite this observation, Justice Douglas later cited Muller v. Ore-
gon for the proposition that women are physically different from
men,80 a fact he felt was relevant to questions about where and
how women should work.
The idea that women are different, contrasted to the idea that it
is men who are different, reflects the very patriarchal culture to
which Justice Douglas earlier alluded. It is a male-dominated cul-
ture that sets men up as the normative model and women as the
deviation, rather than vice versa.
In his dissent, Justice White emphasized the concept of individ-
ual treatment without regard to sex. 8' This individual rights no-
tion too easily becomes perverted into another way to benefit men.
"[Tlhe paradox of remedies for sex and race discrimination is that
often they must take sex and race into account. ' 82 To ignore sex,
77416 U.S. 351 (1974).
78 1d. at 352 (quoting Shevin v. Kahn, 273 So.2d 72 (1973)). The use of the singular
form of the nouns "man" and "woman" is interesting here since in fact the Court's
reasoning requires one to make sex-based generalizations about men and women as
groups. It is also interesting because in the context of this case, which involved tax
returns, broad sex-based generalizations would not be necessary. An individual's par-
ticular tax return would be readily available to provide information about his or her
need for a tax reduction.
7 9 Id. at 353.
80 d. at 356 n.10.
8 1 1d. at 361-62 (White, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the dangers of an indi-
vidual rights approach, see infra text accompanying notes 88-91.
82 B. BABCOCK, supra note 10, at 124.
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as Justice White advocates, 3 leads to a perpetuation of the status
quo in which women are the victims of discrimination.
In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur84 and its companion
case, Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board,85 sex discrimina-
tion on account of pregnancy was also at issue. In these cases,
decided several months prior to Geduldig, the Court heard a chal-
lenge to two school boards' mandatory maternity leave policies.
The school districts' policies required pregnant teachers to stop
teaching in the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy regardless of
time of school year, health of the woman, or her own desires. Al-
though the case was argued in existing sex discrimination equal
protection language,86 the Court struck down the school boards'
policies on due process grounds: "This Court has long recognized
that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family
life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."87 The case represented a victory for
women in one sense by supporting the idea that the mandatory
maternity leave policy was unfair when it took away the pregnant
women's right to choose to be pregnant and to continue working.
However, by ignoring the equal protection arguments that were
part of the case, the Court refused to ground its support for the
pregnant women in the equal protection clause. The Court's im-
plicit refusal to recognize that this was an issue of sex discrimina-
tion rather than of individual rights undermines the notion of
equality. The opinion emphasized the individual rights at stake,
stating, "[Tihe ability of any particular pregnant woman to con-
tinue at work past any fixed time in her pregnancy is very much
an individual matter.
8 8
Individual rights are certainly implicated in any decision that
forces pregnant women to behave in one way or another, but it is
83 416 U.S. at 361 (White, J., dissenting). Note also the dissent of Justice Brennan,
joined by Justice Marshall, in which Justice Brennan advocates a test of "close judi-
cial scrutiny," id. at 357, but in fact does not use it. Instead Justice Brennan looks for
a "more precisely tailored statute" or use of "less drastic means." Id. at 360.
84414 U.S. 632 (1974).
85 1d.
86 In LaF/eur, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found a violation of the
equal protection clause. 414 U.S. at 636. In Cohen, the District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia found the school board regulation to be in violation of the equal
protection clause, but the Fourth Circuit reversed and upheld the constitutionality of
the challenged regulation. Id. at 638.
87 1d. at 639-40.
88 Id. at 645.
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the invasion of the group right, the prohibition on women who
become pregnant as a class of people, that is the violation of equal
protection and that offends the equality principle.
One danger in the due process or individual rights approach is
exemplified in the case itself where the Court seeks to distinguish
from its holding those mandatory leave provisions "requiring a
termination of employment at some firm date during the last few
weeks of pregnancy." 9 The Court hints that the due process bal-
ance shifts as the pregnancy comes closer to term, making the wo-
man's choice to participate in the work force less important.90
Thus the danger of the due process approach is the diminishment
of the importance of the woman's choice.
A parallel reasoning was used by the Court in the abortion
cases, where the woman's interest in abortion was held to diminish
as the state interest increased.9' The existing political reality is
one where women will not be given an absolute power to decide
their fates,92 whether it be an abortion decision or termination of
employment to bear a child. To deny women this control over
their fates denies them full social participation.
Schlesinger v. Ballard93 was the next case decided in the Court's
struggle to find an appropriate standard of review in sex discrimi-
nation cases. The plaintiff, a male navy officer, complained that
he was subjected to mandatory discharge under a statute that al-
lowed women to serve for a longer period of time prior to dis-
charge than men. Applying a rational basis test, the Court found
it reasonable for Congress to provide that women be kept longer
than men prior to discharge because 'male and female line of-
ficers in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect to oppor-
tunities for professional service." 94  The Court found a
justification for the gender-based treatment in the fact that women
had fewer opportunities in the military than men. Schlesinger is a
case that makes no sense. The gender-based classification upheld
by the Court does not remedy the fact that women are discrimi-
89 Id. at 647 n.13.
90 Id.
91 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
92 One can only wonder why women, and not men, have major life choices made
for them. Certainly there are constitutional areas, like the right to speech protected
by the first amendment, where individual choice decreases as the state interest in-
creases. But such areas burden both women and men equally. This author knows of
no area where men's choices are burdened and women's are not.
93 419 U.S. 498, reh'g denied, 420 U.S. 966 (1975).
9 4
,1d. at 508 (emphasis in original).
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nated against in the military and, therefore, have fewer opportuni-
ties. The use of a gender classification here hurts men and does
not benefit women. The case presents yet another illustration of
the problem with the comparison mode of equal protection re-
view. Since men and women were not "similarly situated" in the
first place, the Court could not make the comparison and recog-
nize the discrimination problems created by using a gender-based
classification. 95
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld96 and Stanton v. Stanton, both de-
cided in 1975, typified easy cases for the Court under the compari-
son mode. The male plaintiff in Wiesenfeld challenged a statute
under which he was denied social security survivors' benefits
when his wife died. A woman under the same statute would have
received such benefits on the death of her husband. In Stanton,
the defendant challenged a state statute that provided different
ages of majority, eighteen years for women and twenty-one years
for men. The Court struck both statutes as unconstitutional.
The question of whether it was a man or a woman being dis-
criminated against troubled the Court in Wiesenfeld. While re-
solved to the Court's satisfaction in this particular case,9 8 the issue
of who is the object of discrimination and how that issue should
color review recurs in later cases. 99
The Stanton case presented much language on archaic notions
about women's place."° The case also presents the first indication
of the Court's recognition of another level of equal protection re-
view, termed "something in between." The Court concluded "that
under any test-compelling state interest, or rational basis, or
something in between-[the challenged section] . does not sur-
vive an equal protection attack."''
95 The discriminatory result reached in Schlesinger was dictated by the comparison
mode of equal protection review. The Court's starting point for analysis was to as-
sume the legal legitimacy of historical discrimination against women in the military.
To continue this traditional analysis, which proceeds from the assumption that the
men and women being compared are similarly situated, is to require the Court to
reach results that perpetuate the discrimination. See infra text accompanying notes
124-25.
96420 U.S. 636 (1975).
97421 U.S. 7 (1975).
98 The majority found comfort in the fact that working women were receiving less
protection for their families than working men under the statutory scheme. Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 645.
99 See infra text accompanying note 179.
100421 U.S. at 10.
01Id. at 17.
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Craig v. Boren 10 2 represented the culmination of the Supreme
Court's struggle to find a standard of review within the equal pro-
tection framework for sex discrimination cases. The case involved
the important social question of whether a statute allowing boys,
aged twenty-one, to buy 3.2 beer was constitutional when girls
were permitted to buy 3.2 beer at age eighteen. In its opinion, the
Court recognized the "something in between"'' °3 level of scrutiny
that some commentators had been urging."° The Court said that
"classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives."' 05
By choosing a different standard of scrutiny for sex discrimina-
tion, the Court was implicitly agreeing that sex discrimination is a
less egregious social ill than race discrimination. Strict scrutiny is
the standard of review in race discrimination cases, while a lesser
standard of review is applied in sex discrimination cases. This im-
plicit belittling of the harm of sex discrimination perpetuates sex
discriminatory attitudes.'0 6
The stereotyping of women into dependent roles, 0 7 the stere-
otyping of fathers as having minimal involvement with their chil-
dren, '8 the right of women to control their destiny," 9 the role of
pregnant women in the work force," 10 the economic disadvantag-
ing of women in the work force,' and discrimination against wo-
men in the military" 2 present a litany of real grievances about the
102 429 U.S. 190 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977).
103 See supra text accompanying note 101.
104 See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 61.
105 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197.
106 The notion that sex discrimination is implicitly less serious than race discrimi-
nation is a widely held belief. I used to think this too. In a class discussion compar-
ing sex and race discrimination, I once commented that no one had ever died as a
result of sex discrimination, whereas many blacks have been persecuted by Southern
lynch mobs operating out of racial hatred. One student raised her hand and asked,
"What about all the women who have died seeking abortions that could not be per-
formed legally and safely?" By failing to see such social problems as sex discrimina-
tion issues we remain unable to recognize the seriousness of sex discrimination.
107 Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973).
1o8 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
109 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
110 Gelduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632 (1974).
1'1 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974).
112 Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
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role assigned to women in this culture. However, when translated
into legal language these claims become a battleground of due
process versus equal protection, strict scrutiny versus reasonable
basis, penumbras of the Bill of Rights, and a questioning of the
very existence of sex discrimination. The abstraction of these very
real social problems into this legal vocabulary has diverted atten-
tion from the immediate goal of combating sex discrimination.
While the standard of review for sex discriminaton was crystal-
lized by Craig v. Boren, little else was illuminated.
III
CASES JUSTIFYING GENDER CLASSIFICATIONS
Following the articulation in Craig v. Boren of the equal protec-
tion standard of review for sex discrimination cases, the Court is-
sued a series of decisions upholding sex-based statutory
classifications which perpetuate gender inequality. The cases
cover a range of important areas: receipt of government bene-
fits,"13 education," 4  family law, 1 5  employment," 6  criminal
law,' ' 7 and military service. 18
While the Court's reasons for upholding sex-based classifica-
tions vary on a case-by-case basis, the justifications are reminis-
cent of familiar themes. Historically, the notions that women had
a special social role to play and that women were biologically dif-
ferent from men were used to justify sex discrimination." 9 In the
Court's recent cases upholding gender-based classifications, these
old justifications for sex discrimination are transformed into mod-
em garb.
''3 Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
114 Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 430 U.S. 703 (1977). The
Vorchheimer case involved the constitutionality of sex-segregated public high schools.
The lower court upheld the sex-segregated school system, Vorchheimer v. School
Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), and the Supreme Court affirmed
per curiam by an equally divided Court. 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (Justice Rehnquist took
no part in the consideration or decision of this case).
Because decisions made by an equally divided Court do not have precedential
value, see, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73 n.8, (1977),
Vorchheimer is not discussed in full in this Part. For a discussion of the area of
education, see the analysis of Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982), at infra text accompanying note 183.
115 Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
116 Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
"17 Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
118 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
119 See supra text accompanying notes 30-50.
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The Court continues to uphold disparate treatment of women
by referring to the past history of discrimination against women:
Women as a group may be treated specially to compensate for the
legal disadvantage women once suffered. Now it is culturally ac-
ceptable to recognize women as playing the role of the victim of
past discrimination. This "special role," however, is used by the
Court as part of the new ideology of sex discrimination to justify
the continuation of that discrimination. 20
The argument that women and men are biologically different
has also been transformed into a twentieth-century version. First
it is determined that women and men are culturally different and,
therefore, not similarly situated. The fact that they are not simi-
larly situated for purposes of equal protection review is then used
to justify the continuation of sex-based classifications that pro-
mote the continuation of those very gender-based cultural differ-
ences. The rationalizations presented by the Court for upholding
the sex-based classifications described in this Part illustrate the sex
discriminatory attitudes that underlie the comparison mode of
equal protection review.
Califano v. Webster' 2' concerned computation of benefits under
the Social Security Act which allowed a wage earner to exclude
certain years of income from the benefit calculation. Women
were allowed to exclude more years than men, resulting in higher
monthly benefits being paid to the retired female wage-earner
than to the retired male wage-earner. The Court upheld this dif-
ferential calculation, holding that the statute met the Craig v. Bo-
ren standard of serving an important governmental objective, and
was substantially related to achieving that objective. 22 In a per
curiam opinion, the Court wrote that the differing treatment was a
deliberate legislative act designed to compensate women for eco-
nomic disabilities suffered by them in the work force. 123
Although the decision benefits women, it nonetheless perpetu-
ates sex discrimination. By the use of the comparison mode, com-
paring working women to working men, the decision validates the
notion that sex discrimination can be ended by using this compar-
ison methodology. One can argue that the comparison mode does
work sometimes, as here, in serving to redress economic differ-
120 See infra text accompanying notes 121-25.
121 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
122 Id. at 317-21.
123 1d. at 320.
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ences between women and men.' 24 However, a standard measur-
ing need, rather than gender, could easily have been used instead,
since data on earnings was part of the computation process. 25 By
using a gender-based classification where it was unnecessary the
Court only perpetuated sex discrimination.
In Parham v. Hughes, 2 plaintiff challenged a Georgia statute
that permitted the mother of an illegitimate child, or a father who
had legitimated the child, to bring a wrongful death suit. The
statute precluded a father who had not legitimated the child from
suing for the child's wrongful death. The Supreme Court found
that the statute did not violate the equal protection clause. Justice
Stewart, writing for the Court, began his analysis with a reminder
that "[s]tate laws are generally entitled to a presumption of valid-
ity against attack under the Equal Protection Clause,"'' 27 but that
not all state laws are "entitled to the same presumption of valid-
ity.""'28 Justice Stewart cited race as the paradigmatic example of
a suspect classification and acknowledged that the presumption of
statutory validity "may also be undermined"'' 29 when classes are
based on other immutable traits, such as national origin, alienage,
illegitimacy and gender. His analysis continues the theme that sex
discrimination is less important than race discrimination, a theme
which was set forth in Craig v. Boren and implicit in the Court's
continuing refusal to recognize sex as a suspect classification.
Justice Stewart also found that "invidious" discrimination must
be present to trigger equal protection review.' 3° He found no in-
vidious discrimination based on illegitimacy or sex. "In cases
where men and women are not similarly situated, however, and a
statutory classification is realistically based upon the differences in
their situations, this Court has upheld its validity."'' Justice
Stewart argued that mothers and fathers of illegitimate children
are not "similarly situated," since only fathers can legitimate chil-
124 Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Benign Class/cation in the Context of Sex, 10
CONN. L. REV. 813 (1978). For a contrary view, see Gertner, Bakke on Affirmative
Actionfor Women: Pedestal or Cage? 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173 (1979).
125 A similar argument was made by Justice Brennan, dissenting, in Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 360 (1974).
126 441 U.S. 347 (1979).




131 Id. at 354.
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dren; thus, the difference in statutory treatment is not based on
generalizations about men as a class.
This analysis again illustrates the poverty of the comparison
mode. The Court must perceive women and men to be similarly
situated for this kind of equal protection review to be triggered.
Here, the Court finds differences in their situations. However, so-
cially created differences exist in the situations of men and women
because, as a result of centuries of discrimination, the social real-
ity of women and men is different. This is the very discrimination
about which the Court purports to be so concerned. Dissimilar
situations of women and men are the norm, and will continue to
be the norm, as long as the comparative mode requires that men
and women be similarly situated before a constitutional challenge
will be sustained.13
2
Using a Craig v. Boren approach, Justice Powell argued in his
concurrence that the gender-based distinction challenged in
Parham was substantially related to the important state objective
of avoiding the problems of proving paternity in wrongful death
suits. 133 This kind of reasoning supporting the sex-based classifi-
cation is more subtle in its perpetuation of the discrimination. It
has the ring of lawyerly thinking because it uses the Court's equal
protection vocabulary; however, the Court stresses the wrong bal-
ance of factors in that vocabulary. Equality of men and women
has been implicitly viewed as less important than the state's inter-
est in administering its legal system as easily as possible.'34
Unlike many earlier cases that did not have a major practical
impact on women's rights, Personnel Administrator of Massachu-
setts v. Feeney, 135 involving hiring preference granted to veterans
in civil service,' 36 was a very important sex discrimination case
with troubling implications for women. The veterans' preference
was written on the face of the statute in sex neutral language, but
the plaintiff argued that the preference discriminated against wo-
men because it had a severely disproportionate impact upon wo-
132 Dissenting, Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun,
criticized the "startling circularity" of the majority's analysis. Id. at 361.
13 3 Id. at 360-61 (Powell, J., concurring).
134 See infra Part VI, which describes a series of rules for a better balancing of
factors in sex discrimination cases.
135 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
13 6 Id. at 261 ("The Federal Government and virtually all of the States grant some
sort of hiring preference to veterans.").
[Volume 63, 19841
HeinOnline  -- 63 Or. L. Rev. 290 1984
Sex Discrimination
men's job opportunities. 37
The Court acknowledged that "the statute today benefits an
overwhelmingly male class,"'' 38 and yet found that there was no
discriminatory purpose behind the statute.' 39 The Court stated:
"Just as there are cases in which impact alone can unmask an in-
vidious classification . . . there are others, in which-notwith-
standing impact-the legitimate noninvidious purposes of a law
cannot be missed. This is one."'" Reminiscent of the Court's "I
know it when I see it" language in the pornography case, Jacobel-
As v. Ohio, 4 ' the Court here is suggesting that a non-discrimina-
tory disproportionate impact can also be easily spotted by the
137 The plaintiff's own employment history provided a stunning example of this
disproportionate impact:
[The appellee] first entered the state civil service system in 1963, having
competed successfully for a position as Senior Clerk Stenographer in the
Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency. There she worked for four years. In
1967, she was promoted to the position of Federal Funds and Personnel
Coordinator in the same agency. The agency, and with it her job, was elimi-
nated in 1975.
During her 12-year tenure as a public employee, Ms. Feeney took and
passed a number of open competitive civil service examinations. On several
she did quite well, receiving in 1971 the second highest score on an examina-
tion for a job with the Board of Dental Examiners, and in 1973 the third
highest on a test for an Administrative Assistant position with a mental
health center. Her high scores, however, did not win her a place on the
certified eligible list. Because of the veterans' preference, she was ranked
sixth behind five male veterans on the Dental Examiner list. She was not
certified, and a lower scoring veteran was eventually appointed. On the
1973 examination, she was placed in a position on the list behind 12 male
veterans, 11 of whom had lower scores. Following the other examinations
that she took, her name was similarly ranked below those of veterans who
had achieved passing grades.
Ms. Feeney's interest in securing a better job in state government did not
wane. Having been consistently eclipsed by veterans, however, she eventu-
ally concluded that further competition for civil service positions of interest
to veterans would be futile. In 1975, shortly after her civil defense job was
abolished, she commenced this litigation.
Id. at 264-65.
13 8 Id. at 269.
139 Equal protection disparate impact claims require a showing of discriminatory
legislative intent. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("[O]ur cases have
not embraced the proposition that a law . . . , without regard to whether it reflects a
racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has racially dis-
proportionate impact.").
Further, a discriminatory purpose may be allowable if it is not the only purpose.
See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
140 Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275 (citations omitted).
141 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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judge. Here, the mystique of the justice's role is swept aside and
the naked power is revealed.' 42 The injection of the discrimina-
tory purpose requirement into equal protection jurisprudence pro-
vides the Court with another justification for maintaining a status
quo of discrimination.
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 43 a case in-
volving California's statutory rape law criminalizing only conduct
by males, also illustrates the inability of a judiciary using the com-
parison mode of analysis to end sex discrimination. The Court
wrote that the equal protection clause did not "'demand that a
statute necessarily apply equally to all persons' or require ' "things
which are different in fact. . . to be treated in law as though they
were the same."'" 144
By emphasizing a process which compares women to men, and
discovering that the two are different, the Court's interpretation of
the equal protection clause clearly points out the problem with the
comparison mode. That women and men are different should
come as no great surprise. The problem in equal protection terms
is the perpetuation of constitutionally impermissible disparate
treatment of men and women. To say that since men and women
are different they may be treated differently ignores the very no-
tion of equality of rights under law that the fourteenth amend-
ment protects. The comparison mode, insofar as it urges the
Court to find that men and women are similar before finding a
constitutional violation, perverts the notion of equal justice.
In Michael M, Justice Rehnquist concluded:
In upholding the California statute we also recognize that this
is not a case where a statute is being challenged on the grounds
that it 'invidiously discriminates' against females. To the con-
trary, the statute places a burden on males which is not shared
by females. But we find nothing to suggest that men, because
of past discrimination or peculiar disadvantages, are in need of
the special solicitude of the courts. '45
By writing into the majority opinion his view that disparate treat-
ment of men does not contravene the equal protection clause, Jus-
142 It is neither pornography nor a discriminatory purpose because he says so.
"He" is used intentionally here because the judiciary remains overwhelmingly male.
Who a judge is affects his or her assessment of discriminatory purpose.
143 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
144Id. at 469 (quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966), quoting Tigner
v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)).
145 Id. at 475-76.
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tice Rehnquist validated the belief he expressed previously in his
dissent to Craig v. Boren. 46 In that dissent, Justice Rehnquist dis-
missed the idea that discrimination against men might "redound
to the detriment of females, because they tend to reinforce 'old
notions' restricting the roles and opportunities of women."'' 47 He
emphasized that discrimination against men hardly counts for
constitutional purposes.
The importance attached to the gender of the victim raises a
particularly insidious side effect of the comparison mode of equal
protection review. If the first question is who is the plain-
tiff-male or female-and the case result flows from the answer,
then the idea of equal justice under law seems hypocritical. The
goal of ending sex discrimination may benefit females more than
males to the extent that women have been treated unfairly more
often and in more ways than men. However, ending sex discrimi-
nation should not offer women special protection not also offered
to men. Justice Rehnquist's belief that women need protection is
just a twentieth-century version of chivalry, complete with the
pedestal which continues to be a cage.148
In Rostker v. Goldberg 149 the Court held that the Military Selec-
tive Services Act, authorizing registration of males, but not fe-
males, for possible conscription, does not violate the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws.' 5 ° In justifying this
conclusion, Justice Rehnquist said, "Congress was fully aware not
merely of the many facts and figures presented to it by witnesses
who testified before its Committees, but of the current thinking as
to the place of women in the Armed Services.'' 1 To justify the
holding, the Court cites, as a matter of constitutional review, to
the legislative political process which led to the sex discriminatory
result. "'52 This kind of reasoning ignores the role of the Court as
146 429 U.S. 190, 217 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
14 7 id. at 220 n.2.
148 Compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) ("Traditionally,
such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which,
in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage."), with Sail'er Inn, Inc.
v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 20, 485 P.2d 529, 541, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 341 (1971) ("The
pedestal upon which women have been placed has all too often, upon closer inspec-
tion, been revealed as a cage.").
149453 U.S. 57 (1981).
150 See supra note 3.
151 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added).
152 The Court also implicitly cites public opinion as it was reflected in the legisla-
tive judgment concerning the propriety of allowing women to participate fully in the
armed forces. Public opinion is the ideological antithesis of an appropriate standard
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the protector of "discrete and insular minorities" 15 3 who might not
be adequately represented by that political process.
The Court cites this refusal by the legislative branch to extend
the Act to include registration by women as evidence that the de-
cision was not an "accidental by-product of a traditional way of
thinking about females."' 154 It is convoluted reasoning, at best, to
assert that the decision is any less the by-product of traditional
thinking about women because the choice is made with legislative
purpose rather than by accident. The danger behind this kind of
judicial reasoning is that the traditional sex discriminatory ways
of thinking about women, which remain at the root of the deci-
sion-making process, will be upheld with the cloak of judicial
approval.
The mosaic of equal protection vocabulary developed in this
series of cases upholding sex-based classifications is chilling to any
advocate of full societal participation. The hope generated by
Reed and Frontiero that the Court would redress claims of sex
discrimination has not become a reality in our society, where wo-
men may not be drafted, yet jobs are awarded based on a prefer-
ence to veterans, where only women receive the protection of rape
laws, and where an uninvolved male role in the family is legiti-
mized. The comparison mode of equality has been used to perpet-
uate existing differences between the treatment of women and
men. The language developed in these cases will continue to be
used to perpetuate and justify this denial of full participation in
the future.
IV
CASES STRIKING SEX-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS
Since the appropriate standard of scrutiny in sex discrimination
equal protection claims was formulated in Craig v. Boren,"' the
Court has considered seven cases in which gender-based legisla-
tive classifications were struck down.'56 An observer might com-
for judicial review. The Court was being remarkably candid about the degree to
which its decisions may be influenced by public opinion.
153 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
154 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 74 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313,
320 (1977), quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
155 See supra text accompanying note 105.
156 Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979);
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ment that the Court will uphold sex-based classifications when
they are substantially related to important legislative purposes;
but when they are not so related to the legislative purposes, the
Court will combat sex discrimination by striking the gender classi-
fications. This message, that the legal system is working to fight
discrimination, is an important part of the ideology of equality.
However, a closer examination of these cases in which the Court
has struck down gender classifications reveals that they too per-
petuate sex discrimination, or, at least, that they are not effectively
combating it. 157
Initially, it is hardest to see how a group of cases which have
struck down sex-based classifications can perpetuate sex discrimi-
nation. It would seem that the Court's act in declaring these par-
ticular gender-based legislative classifications unconstitutional is
directed toward eradicating sex discrimination itself. In fact, the
cases do contain some strong language indicating the Court's de-
sire to end sex discrimination. 5 8
However, close study of the method of analysis and the substan-
tive decisions of the cases reveals that these opinions complement
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979);
Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450
U.S. 455 (1981); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
157 Of course, some social good comes from these decisions because they do combat
sex discrimination by the very fact that they strike gender-based classifications. The
criticism in this Part, however, is aimed at the broader jurisprudential picture to illus-
trate how the Court's decisions, on balance, are serving to perpetuate the status quo of
sex discrimination.
158 See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724-25 ("[T]he test
for determining the validity of a gender-based classification . . . must be applied free
of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females. . . . Thus if
the statutory objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of one gender because they
are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objec-
tive itself is illegitimate."); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. at 89 ("[This gender classifi-
cation is] part of the 'baggage of sexual stereotypes' that presumes the father has the
'primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials', while the mother is the
center of home and family life.' Legislation that rests on such presumptions . . .
cannot survive scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." (ci-
tations omitted)); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 403-04 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) ("Habit . . . makes it seem acceptable . . . to distinguish between male and
female...; for too much of our history there was the same inertia in distinguishing
between black and white. But that sort of stereotyped reaction may have no rational
relationship-other than pure prejudicial discrimination--to the stated purpose for
which the classification is being made.") (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,
520-21 (1976)(Stevens, J., dissenting)); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at 283 ("Where . . . the
State's compensatory and ameliorative purposes are as well served by a gender-neu-
tral classification as one that gender classifies and therefore carries with it the baggage
of sexual stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of sex.").
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the line of cases legitimating sex discrimination that were dis-
cussed in the last section. The most obvious way in which these
cases perpetuate sex discrimination is by their adoption of the
comparison mode of analysis,"5 9 which encourages a viewpoint of
the issues that ignores the real problem of sex discrimination. The
discrimination is further perpetuated by a doctrinal confusion in
the opinions about who is harmed by sex discrimination. The
cases contain some troubling language and ultimately benefit
male victims of discrimination more than female victims.
In each of these cases a statutory gender classification enabled
the Court to compare the treatment of women and men under the
legislative scheme. Three cases involved disparate payment of
statutory benefits which the Court found unconstitu-
tional--Califano v. Goldfarb (OASDI), 6 ° Caifano v. Westcott
(AFDC),' 6 ' and Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co.
(workers' compensation).' 62 Three cases dealt with state statutory
schemes relating to family law which the Court struck down--Orr
v. Orr (male-only alimony statute), 163 Caban v. Mohammed (un-
wed father could not block adoption), 164 and Kirchberg v. Feenstra
(exclusive management and control of community property by
husband). 165 The final case, Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan,166 involved a challenge to a state funded, women's only,
graduate school in nursing.
In each of these cases the Court's requirement that women and
men be similarly situated for the purpose of an equal protection
review was easily met. 167 Men and women both sought govern-
ment benefits, men and women were both subjected to state fam-
ily laws, and a man sought entry to a graduate program in which
women were admitted.
Even with the easily available comparison between women and
men, the Court's decisions were not unanimous, 16 8 nor was the
159 See supra text accompanying notes 7-11.
160430 U.S. 199 (1977).
161 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
162446 U.S. 142 (1980).
163 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
164441 U.S. 380 (1979).
165450 U.S. 455 (1981).
166458 U.S. 718 (1982).
167 For contrast, see Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 79 (1981); Michael M. v.
Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981). See also supra text
accompanying notes 130-31.
168 Three separate opinions were filed in Califano v. Goldfarb; five in Orr v. Orr;
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method of analysis used in the opinions always simple. In West-
cott, the Court debated whether the classification was gender-
based.'69 In Goldfarb, Orr, and Wengler the Court continued the
debate concerning who was being discriminated against, women
or men. 1
70
By applying the Craig v. Boren standard and asking whether the
challenged gender discriminations are substantially related to im-
portant government objectives, the cases also perpetuate sex dis-
crimination. The Craig standard remains a watered-down form of
equal protection review and does not present a strong statement
about the importance of ending sex discrimination. In Hogan, a
most recent sex discrimination decision, the Court again declined
to decide whether classifications based on gender are "inherently
suspect."' 7 ' The Court's continued stance, refusing to recognize
the importance of sex-based discrimination in terms of the com-
parison mode of equal protection review, reinforces the notion
that sex discrimination is a mere tempest in a teapot that can be
adequately treated by a tepid standard of review. An even stricter
standard of equal protection review, if still utilizing the compari-
son mode, would not effectively end sex discrimination.
There is language in each of these cases that could be used to
perpetuate sex discrimination. The Court in Goldfarb, describing
Frontiero v. Richardson, wrote that "differential treatment. . . for
the sole purpose of achieving administrative convenience" was
unconstitutional. 7 2 Apparently if it is not the sole purpose, but
only part of a purpose, administrative convenience may justify a
gender-based classification. To suggest that sex discrimination
will be allowed in instances where discrimination is administra-
tively convenient does not present a very strong argument that sex
discrimination is unacceptable.
There is also some troubling language in Orr. There, the Court
considered "whether women had in fact been significantly dis-
criminated against in the sphere to which the statute applied a sex-
based classification, leaving the sexes 'not similarly situated with
three in Caban v. Mohammed; two in Califano v. Westcott; three in Wengler v. Drug-
gists Mut. Insur. Co.; two in Kirchberg v. Feenstra; and four in Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan.
169 Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. at 83-84.
170 Wengler v. Druggists Mut. insur. Co., 446 U.S. at 147; Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at
281-82; Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 208-09.
171 458 U.S. at 724 n.9.
172 430 U.S. at 205 (emphasis added).
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respect to opportunities' in that sphere."' 73 Justice Blackmun
noted the problem with this language, and concurred in the result
only "[o]n the assumption. .. [that the above language] does not
imply that society-wide discrimination is always irrelevant."'
17 4
Justice Blackmun correctly perceived that the extension of the
troublesome "similarly situated" requirement to particular
spheres of discrimination, and the elimination from consideration
of society-wide discrimination, would make the comparison mode
standard of review much too narrow.
In fact, the substantive decisions in these cases are themselves
rather narrow and have only a limited impact. Wengler involved
a type of worker's compensation statute that had been struck
down in three other jurisdictions which had considered similar
statutes, and that was no longer widespread. 175 The statute in
Kirchberg had already been repealed by the time that case was
argued.'76 The single-sex institution of higher education in Ho-
gan was one of only two such sex-segregated, state funded institu-
tions in the nation.177 The Court in Hogan went to great lengths
to ensure that the issue presented was "narrow" and that the deci-
sion was viewed as having a limited impact. 178 The Court also
declined to address whether the Mississippi University for Wo-
men's admission policy "as applied to males seeking admission to
schools other than the School of Nursing, violates the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 79
There is much discussion in these cases as to whether the dis-
crimination at issue hurt men or women. The majority opinions
in the government benefit cases adopted the view that women are
hurt because they are able to earn less protection for their families
than working men.' 8 1 In this sense, working women were discrim-
inated against by the rules that the Court struck down. However,
in instances where women were economically hurt, as in Fee-
ney,181 or barred from participation in society, as in Rostker,
182
173 Orr v. Orr. 440 U.S. at 281 (first emphasis added).
174 1d. at 284 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
175 446 U.S. at 147 n.3.
176 450 U.S. at 457 n.1.
177 Greenhouse, Court Says School Cannot Bar Men, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1982, at
A1, col. 1.
178 458 U.S. at 719.
179 Id. at 723, n.7.
180 Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Insur. Co., 446 U.S. at 147; Califano v. Goldfarb,
430 U.S. at 206-07. See also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975).
181 Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
182 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
[Volume 63, 19841
HeinOnline  -- 63 Or. L. Rev. 298 1984
Sex Discrimination
and where men did not also benefit from the striking of the gen-
der-based rules, those sex discriminatory classifications were
upheld.
Ironically, most cases in which the Court has combated sex dis-
crimination by striking down gender-based classifications have in-
volved discrimination against men. As a result of the decision in
Califano v. Goldfarb, a man could now get AFDC survivor bene-
fits; in Caban, a father of an illegitimate child could now block an
adoption; in Orr, men have won the right to receive alimony from
women; in Wengler, a man became entitled to receive workers
compensation death benefits when his spouse died; and in Hogan,
a man could attend a previously all female graduate nursing
program. 8
3
Thus, a majority of the cases striking sex-based classifications
involved rectifying discrimination against men. These cases did
present examples of men who were hurt because of sex discrimi-
nation. To the extent one can infer from the decisions that women
are capable of economic self-sufficiency, the Court is combating
sex discrimination against women. However, the main thrust of
this line of decisions is not ending sex discrimination against wo-
men, but rather ending the harm of discrimination as it hurts male
plaintiffs. ' 84
183 The combination of Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 430 U.S. 703
(1977), and Hogan present women with the worst of all worlds. The divided opinion
in Vorchheimer upheld a male-only institution, reasoning that single-sex schools were
beneficial to each sex. Then Hogan found unconstitutional a women-only institution
which served to keep men out and provide women the haven which Forchheimer
advocated. The sum total is that while women could be kept out of all-male institu-
tions, men could not be kept out of all-female institutions.
To the extent that nursing is stereotyped as a female-only occupation, the integra-
tion of men into a women-only nursing school is certainly a positive step toward
ending discrimination. But it is interesting to note that the Court took that step when
the complainant was a man who was denied access to education, rather than a wo-
man, as was the case in Vorchheimer.
184 In Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981), the Court struck down a commu-
nity property law that gave husbands the exclusive right to management and control
of the community property. This ruling does not benefit individual men who might
wish to retain that control, but it does benefit a patriarchal capitalist economic system,
such as ours, by promoting the flow of capital. Kirchberg benefits women by giving
them control of their community property, in addition to benefiting the capitalist
economy.
For another example of this theory that the Court may act in a way that benefits the
victims of discrimination when there are other societal benefits, see Bell, Brown v.
Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518
(1980). This article describes the economic and political advantages for whites in
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In Califano v. Westcott, the Court evaluated and struck down a
legislative classification which disbursed welfare benefits to fami-
lies with unemployed fathers, but not to families with unemployed
mothers. Needy children are the clearest beneficiaries of this ac-
tion by the Court, followed by the parents, which in most in-
stances include both a father and mother. Again, the substantive
beneficiaries of the Court's action in striking the sex-based classifi-
cation were not primarily women, the group most victimized by
sex discrimination.
The debate about whether it is men or women who are hurt by
discrimination perpetuates the discrimination itself. It confuses
the issue as to who is the victim of sex discrimination. While it is
true that men are hurt by sex discriminatory attitudes, the over-
whelming evidence is that women are the real victims of sex dis-
crimination. Ending this victimization against women is the
impetus behind concern about sex discrimination, just as ending
discrimination against blacks, rather than against whites, is the
impetus behind concern about race discrimination.'85 However,
the lack of attention by the Court to the fact that women are the
real victims of sex discrimination enables the Court to preserve
the existing ideology of equality without making any significant
changes in the status quo of sex discrimination. The ideology of
equality in its modern garb presents the message that women and
men must be treated alike, and the Court is purporting to show its
inclination to do so by striking sex-based classifications. In fact,
however, the sex discrimination which the Court is addressing has
operated primarily to the detriment of men. The Court is not as-
sertively combating sex discrimination against women. The strik-
ing of sex-based classifications in these cases legitimates the status
quo of discrimination against women by creating the illusion that
the Court is addressing the issue of sex discrimination and reme-
dying those instances of discrimination that are particularly
egregious.
ending segregation in the post-World War II period. See generally D. BELL, RACE,
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980).
185 Whites and men, as well as blacks and women, will ultimately benefit by an end
to race and sex discrimination.
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V
SEX DISCRIMINATION CASES ANALYZED ON OTHER
GROUNDS
The Supreme Court abortion decisions' 86 legitimize sex dis-
crimination in several ways. The method of analysis used to de-
cide these questions, the language used by the Court in the
opinions, the pattern of decisions that have evolved on both sides
of the question, and the substantive holdings in many of the cases
have adversely affected women's access to reproductive freedom.
Probably no single issue more seriously impacts the rights of
women than the question of access to reproductive freedom. If a
woman cannot control the decision whether or not to bear a child
or to be sterilized, then she has no meaningful opportunity to par-
ticipate in society. Sex discrimination is perpetuated and legiti-
mated by the denial of this control to women.
The abortion cases have been argued and decided in the consti-
tutional terms of denial of a right to privacy. They have not been
litigated and decided as equal protection cases. 187 The failure to
see this issue of access to reproductive freedom as involving the
potential denial of equality of rights under law reveals a serious
problem about contemporary equality theory. The Court has not
conceptualized the reproductive freedom issue as an equality is-
sue, undoubtedly because of the poverty of the comparison mode.
Since men cannot biologically bear children, they do not suffer the
same denial of access to reproductive rights as women. Here
again the biological difference between women and men, in a soci-
186 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973); Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976);
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Singleton v. Wulff,
428 U.S. 106 (1976); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977); Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 917 (1980); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983); Simo-
poulos v. Virginia, 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983).
187 Some of the early abortion cases were argued in equal protection language, but
the discriminatory classification at issue was race, wealth, or age, not gender. See
Brief for Appellant at 46-50, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Brief for Appellant
at 50-61, Planned Parenthood Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Brief for
Appellee at 15-20, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Brief for Respondent at 45-54,
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Brief for Appellee at 32-35, Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622 (1979).
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ety where the model for comparison is men, results in an inability
to perceive the issue as one of sex discrimination.
The right to abortion should be grounded constitutionally in the
fourteenth amendment rather than in a penumbral privacy right.
The basis of the decision is critical because the strength of the
right is determined by its source. The right of equality and free-
dom from sex discrimination implicit in reproductive autonomy is
diluted when grounded in privacy. It is diminished when dis-
cussed along with other interests that are involved in the abortion
decision, such as a doctor's right to make decisions about a pa-
tient, 188 or a state's concern about spending, 189 or a parent's inter-
est in the abortion decision. 9 ° These other interests are
important, but subordinate to the end of eliminating sex discrimi-
nation. The legitimating of other interests and the failure to rec-
ognize these other interests as subordinate diminishes the
importance of women's interest in reproductive freedom.' 9' Bas-
ing the right of access to reproductive freedom in the fourteenth
amendment's promise of equality of rights is a stronger statement
that this right is paramount to ending sex discrimination. Equal-
ity of rights is possible only when women are assured the opportu-
nity of full social participation. Reproductive autonomy is
necessary to that full participation.
The Court's language in these decisions reveals the Court's lack
of awareness of the reality of the abortion decision to the group of
people who must make that decision, ie., women. The Court
made clear in Roe v. Wade that the divergence of views of women
were not in the forefront of concern when they stated, "We forth-
with acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional
nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing
views, even among physicians .. .."' The Court also falls into
the trap provided by the English language of discussing the abor-
188 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 192.
189 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 479.
190 H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 411; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 640.
191 The Court was very candid in its rejection of a right to reproductive freedom:
The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute. In fact,
it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an
unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relation-
ship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions.
The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the
past.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154.
19 2 Id. at 116 (emphasis added).
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tion question in terms of male gender: "[W]e have inquired into
. . .medical and medical-legal history and what that history
reveals about man's attitudes toward the abortion procedure over
the centuries."' 93 Although current English usage allows the use
of the word "man" to include women, it is curious that the Court
declined to mention women specifically in a discussion of a deci-
sion pertaining to women's physiology. To the extent that lan-
guage does affect the way that we perceive the world, 9 ' this
judicial failure to include women exacerbates the problem that the
right to reproductive freedom is not seen as an issue largely bear-
ing on women's freedom.
The abortion cases decided by the Supreme Court reveal an in-
teresting, albeit usual, pattern in which decisions are made that
establish lines of cases as precedent for and against reproductive
freedom issues. The first cases, Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton,
established a woman's right to privacy as to the abortion decision.
Although it was a begrudged right,'95 the decision did afford a
measure of reproductive freedom to women. In Beal v. Doe 196
and Maher v. Roe, 197 a state interest in support of childbirth was
manufactured out of whole cloth, thereby establishing support for
conflicting sides of the reproductive rights question.
A similar pattern is evidenced concerning the question of pa-
rental consent to abortion. In Planned Parenthood of Central Mis-
souri v. Danforth,'98 the Court held that parents could not have a
blanket, unreviewable power to veto the abortion decision. In
H.L. v. Matheson 99 a parental notice statute was upheld. Thus,
in the area of parental consent, cases can now be cited in support
of both sides of opposing views. This process of law which estab-
lishes two separate lines of cases, rather than a jurisprudence fo-
cused upon a consistent stance, perpetuates sex discrimination. If
the eradication of sex discrimination were prioritized, then the de-
193 1d. at 116-17 (emphasis added).
194 Language influences how we think about the world. For example, if lawyers are
always referred to as "him," we think of lawyers as male. If nurses are always "she,"
we think of nursing as a female profession. See WOMEN AND LANGUAGE IN LITERA-
TURE AND SOCIETY (S. McConnell-Ginet ed. 1980).
195 "[T]he right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but ...this
right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in
regulation." 410 U.S. at 154.
196 432 U.S. at 445-46.
197 432 U.S. at 478.
198 428 U.S. at 74.
199 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
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lineation of factors that would lead to that eradication would be
simplified.
Women's right to reproductive freedom is objectified by these
Court decisions. The right has been characterized as one of many
factors which the Court must balance, and has been viewed as an
issue removed from the body of the woman who must make the
decision. The Court's discussions make irrelevant the agony of
women faced with the decision to undergo an abortion. The sepa-
ration of the Court's opinions from the very real human anguish
involved ignores an important social reality in women's lives.
VI
ENDING SEX DISCRIMINATION: A PARTICIPATORY
PERSPECTIVE
Sex discrimination, like race discrimination, is a part of the so-
ciety in which we live. Discriminatory acts are often done uncon-
sciously because certain patterns of behavior are such an integral
part of our social structure that we do not immediately perceive
them as discriminatory. Sex discrimination exists in all social are-
nas. It is present in the area of home life, which is usually desig-
nated as the "private" sphere and somewhat insulated from legal
intervention; and it exists in the "public" sphere in both the work-
place and in the field of education, which determines an individ-
ual's ability to gain access to that work.
To survivors of the rebirth of the feminist movement in the
1960's, these ideas are not new. What has become clouded in the
public mind is the fact that it is women and girls, not men and
boys, who are the primary victims of this pervasive societal dis-
crimination. Women earn $0.59 for every dollar earned by men
(and minority women earn less); women receive little if any sup-
port in the work force for pregnancy and child rearing (a role usu-
ally assigned to them by the so-called "private" sphere); women
have uncompensated work at home that makes their true work
week (paid and unpaid) longer than men's; and women risk their
lives daily to terminate unwanted or unaffordable pregnancies
when the means for legal and safe abortion is denied to them.
Women, not men, are the victims of sex discrimination, just as
blacks and not whites are the victims of race discrimination. Of
course, men may be discriminated against on the basis of sex. A
man who wants a leave from work to raise children will be viewed
as odd; a man who wants to work in a "woman's job" like nursing
[Volume 63, 1984]
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will be looked at askance. Similarly, whites suffer from race dis-
crimination. White students who attend segregated schools miss
out on important educational opportunities. However, in the area
of race discrimination, it is clear to most observers of this nation's
history that blacks are the victims of race discrimination. That
clarity of vision has been obscured in the area of sex
discrimination.
The comparison mode of equal protection theory perpetuates
sex discrimination. The comparison mode allows the Court to
maintain an ambivalent attitude toward ending sex discrimination
that reflects the ambivalence in society and in our Constitution. If
Congress proposed a constitutional amendment 2°° or enacted leg-
islation20 that mandated an end to sex discrimination, the Court
would have to be less ambivalent. In the absence of this ap-
proach, a philosophy of judicial review which takes seriously the
need to protect those unrepresented in the political process 202
could result in a jurisprudence aimed at ensuring full participation
in society for all citizens. These events have not occurred, and the
possibility of their occurring is affected by society's perception of
what equality means and of how the path to ending sex discrimi-
nation should be charted. To the extent that the legal system
serves to legitimate discrimination, the possibility of empowering
women diminishes.
That the law legitimates inequality is a theme of many contem-
porary legal scholars.20 3 However, in the area of sex discrimina-
tion a special problem is presented that goes beyond a critique of
American jurisprudence and the broken promise of equality.
Achievement of equal justice between women and men ultimately
requires understanding our differences. In order to derive a juris-
prudence that makes an equalization of power relations possible,
differences in the present social reality of men and women, as well
as biological differences, must be considered.2°
200 See Clymer, Time Runs Out for Proposed Rights Amendment, N.Y. Times, July
1, 1982, at A12.
201 Binion, The ERA. A Job/or Congress, San Francisco Chron., Sept. 26, 1982,
§ This World, at 19.
2 02 See supra note 153.
203 D. HAY, P. LINEBAUGH, J. RULE, E. THOMPSON, & C. WINSLOw, ALBION'S FA-
TAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1975);
Balbus, supra note 4; Freeman, supra note 29; Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's
Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1979); Lawrence, Segregation "Misunder-
stood". The Milliken Decision Revisited, 12 U.S.F.L. REV. 15 (1977).
204 This path is not without dangers. By acknowledging differences, the door is
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It is easy to see why the comparison approach to equality is an
attractive one. It comports with our societal notions about equal-
ity and is part of our national ideology. We do not want "special
treatment" and we especially do not want others to receive it. We
fear that if we abandon the idea of undifferentiated treatment spe-
cial classes of people would be created.
The fallacy of this argument lies in the fact that we already
have special classes in this society and that the ideology of equal-
ity to which we cling comes from statements like Thomas Jeffer-
son's, "All Men are created equal." The comparison approach to
equality ignores the historical reality that women have been
treated differently and disadvantageously throughout this nation's
history.2"5
Since the comparison mode of analyzing equality serves only to
perpetuate sex discrimination, another approach must be substi-
tuted.2" 6 A participatory perspective, aimed at ensuring full socie-
tal participation, would accomplish the goal of eliminating sex
discrimination.2"7 The fact that women and men are not similarly
situated in this culture must be acknowledged as a starting point
for any meaningful equal protection review that would end sex
discrimination. In the past, the Court has used the biological dif-
ferences between men and women to justify disadvantaging wo-
men. The participatory perspective avoids this oppressive use of
biological differences.
open for judicial emphasis on inequality. See Williams, The Equality Crisis- Some
Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMAN'S RTS. L. REP. 175 (1982).
205 For a compelling description of life within patriarchy, see A. RICH, OF WOMAN
BORN, (1976). See also Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 83 (1980).
206 Other interpretations of the equal protection clause are possible, see Fiss supra
note 11, as is a constitutional amendment. While it seems clear that such changes in
the legal system are unlikely to be accomplished outside of accompanying turmoil in
the political arena, it is still necessary, in trying to bring about those changes, to con-
sider what kind of approach to the fourteenth amendment would in fact serve to
promote an end to sex discrimination.
207 Several commentators have also addressed this question of how to end sex dis-
crimination. See Freedman, The Equal Protection Clause, Title VII and Differences
Between Men and Women. A Critical Analysis of Contemporary Sex Discrimination
Jurisprudence, 92 YALE L.J. - (1983) (forthcoming); Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. - (1984) (forthcoming); Scales, Towards a Feminist
Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375 (1981); Wasserstrom, supra note 5; Note, Toward a
Redefinition of Sexual Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 487 (1981); MacKinnon, Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence (Book Review), 34 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1982). See also W.
CHAFE, WOMEN AND EQUALITY: CHANGING PATrERNS IN AMERICAN CULTURE
(1977); E. WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN (1980).
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According to a participatory perspective, the following postu-
lates must be applied in reviewing any sex-based classification:
Rule 1: Avoid sex-based classifications where possible. Classi-
fications that are explicitly sex-based or that have a disparate im-
pact on women are inherently suspicious.
Rule 2: If a classification is unavoidably sex-based, remember
that it is women who have been historically discriminated against
by sex-based classifications, and that sex-based classifications that
are harmful to women are not acceptable.
Rule 3: In determining whether a sex-based classification is
harmful to women consider the following:
(a) Does the classification stigmatize women?
(b) Does the classification serve to limit women's choice of so-
cial role exclusively to the private sphere?
(c) Does the classification prevent or hinder women from mak-
ing their own choices about their individual social role?
Rule 4: In determining whether a sex-based classification is de-
sirable, consider the following:
(a) Does the classification provide for greater participation in
the public sphere by women?
(b) Does the classification provide greater access to education
to women?
(c) Does the classification provide women with greater deci-
sion-making power over their own lives?
(d) Does the classification foster the image of women as capa-
ble, competent persons?
Critics will be concerned with how this legal interest in women,
this prioritization, will end. I suggest we be concerned with
whether it will ever start. We need a legislative, social, and judi-
cial commitment to end sex discrimination against women.
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